Hostile takeover regimes in Asia: A comparative approach by VAROTTIL, Umakanth & WAN, Wai Yee
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
1-2019
Hostile takeover regimes in Asia: A comparative
approach
Umakanth VAROTTIL
Wai Yee WAN
Singapore Management University, wywan@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Comparative and
Foreign Law Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
VAROTTIL, Umakanth and WAN, Wai Yee. Hostile takeover regimes in Asia: A comparative approach. (2019). Berkeley Business Law
Journal. 15, (2), 267-305. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2896
  1 
 
 
Hostile Takeover Regimes in Asia: A Comparative Approach  
 
Umakanth Varottil* 
Wai Yee Wan** 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The market for corporate control operates as a key corporate governance mechanism in that 
shareholders of a company can rely on it as a tool to discipline management. Where the share 
price is depressed because of a company’s failure to maximize shareholder returns, 
prospective acquirers may unlock value by acquiring the company and replacing the 
company’s management.1 The United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.), whose 
public markets are characterized by dispersed shareholdings, have active markets for 
corporate control. However, notwithstanding the similarities in shareholding structures and 
systems of corporate governance, the regulation of hostile takeovers differs remarkably 
between the U.S. and the U.K.2 The U.K. adopts a strict board neutrality rule3 in which 
shareholders are the primary arbiters of the success of a takeover offer. In contrast, in 
Delaware, which is home to more than 50% of U.S. publicly traded companies,4 the board of 
the target has a significant (though not exclusive) say in the outcome of the takeover offer.  
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1  Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender 
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). 
2  See, e.g. John Armour & David Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The 
Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation 95 GEO. L.J. 1727-1794 (2007); John Armour, Jack 
Jacobs & Curtis Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: 
An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J 219 (2011). 
3  The board neutrality rule, also referred to as the “no frustration” rule, provides that when a target 
company becomes the subject matter of a takeover, the board of the target must not take any action that might 
frustrate the offer, without first obtaining the approval of the shareholders. See, Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover 
Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking UK Rules to Continental Europe, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 135, 
141 (2008). 
4  Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, DEL. Div. OF CORPs., available at 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/. 
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In their seminal work, Armour and Skeel argue that the reasons behind the differences 
between takeover regulation in the U.S. and the U.K. are based on interest group politics.5 
The U.K. system, as exemplified by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers6 (the “UK 
Takeover Code”), prioritizes shareholder protection, and is attributable to the UK’s self-
regulatory regime and aggressive lobbying by strong institutional shareholders. In the U.S., in 
contrast, where the courts remain the arbiter of takeover disputes, the judgment of the boards 
and management is given greater leeway in their determination of the interests of the 
company.7 Armour and Skeel make an important contribution in explaining that the process 
of takeover regulation does influence the outcome or the substance of the regulation. U.K. 
takeover regulation is shaped by institutional shareholders pre-empting legislative 
intervention while U.S. regulation is derived from judge-made case law, largely from 
Delaware.8  
 
Influential as it is, can the theory of interest group politics, and its application to takeover 
regulation, be extended outside of the U.S. and the U.K., particularly to their legal transplants 
in Asia? From a theoretical perspective, the key determinants of the outcome of takeover 
regulation on legal transplants is an important question because the U.S. and the U.K. have 
both been significant exporters of takeover regulation.9 In particular, their respective regimes 
on hostile takeovers have been disseminated around the world, and Asia is no exception. Six 
of the significant economies in Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, India, Korea and Singapore), 
which are also the largest takeover markets in the region, have adopted features of either or 
both of the U.S. and the U.K. models. A study of takeover regulation in these six countries 
would provide a substantial representative understanding of takeover regulation in Asia more 
broadly. They cover the leading emerging economies of China and India, the leading Asian 
financial centres of Singapore and Hong Kong and the significant economies of Korea and 
Japan. This combination includes a balanced representation of both common law (India, 
Hong Kong and Singapore) and civil law (China, Japan and Korea) countries that enables us 
to examine the influence of legal tradition on takeover regulation. 
 
Yet, Asia differs significantly from the U.S. and the U.K. In particular, while the U.S. and the 
U.K. are largely represented by companies with dispersed share ownership, the shareholding 
structures in Asia are far more concentrated.10 Moreover, the legal institutions supporting 
                                                 
5  Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1781. 
6  Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code: The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, 12th 
edn (2016). 
7  Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1730.  
8  However, takeover regulation in the U.S. is in part governed by the Williams Act, a federal statute. See, 
infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
9  For the trends in diffusion of corporate law in general through legal transplants, see Daniel Berkowitz, 
Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51. AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 165 (2003); Holger 
Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU 
L. REV. 1813, 1812-13 (2009). For a broader discourse on legal transplants, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1993); Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal 
Transplant, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 112 (1997).  
10  In addition to concentration of shareholding, cross-shareholdings or circular shareholdings as well as 
pyramid holding structures may also be present. For example, in Korea, see, Hyeok-Joon Rho, M&A in Korea: 
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takeover regulation, such as the securities regulator, the stock exchange and the judiciary, are 
very different from those in the U.S. and the U.K. in dealing with matters of takeover 
regulation. Given these fundamental differences, would the considerations that shaped the 
optimal mode of takeover regulation in the U.S. or the U.K. continue to be relevant to Asia? 
If not, what factors stimulated the design and implementation of takeover regulation in our 
Asian jurisdictions? Our exploration of these questions forms the crux of this article. 
 
A strain of existing scholarship argues that notwithstanding these differences, Armour and 
Skeel’s account of takeover regulation continues to be relevant in explaining the diversity of 
takeover regulation regimes in Europe,11 Japan12 and China (with modification).13 However, 
if Armour and Skeel’s theory is correct and complete, there are at least two puzzles in 
explaining the account of takeover regulation in Asia. First, with the exception (at least 
partially) of Japan, all of the other five Asian jurisdictions are dominated by public 
companies with concentrated shareholdings. Institutional minority shareholders do not have 
the kind of clout that is otherwise present in jurisdictions with widely-held shareholdings. 
They certainly do not bear the type of influence they displayed in shaping takeover regulation 
in the U.K. Yet, why do several Asian jurisdictions (such as India, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) adopt the U.K.-inspired board neutrality rule even though concentrated 
shareholdings are the norm? One would expect that the controlling shareholders in Asian 
jurisdictions would be either indifferent or would prefer the U.S.-approach that favours the 
incumbent management or controlling shareholders.  
 
Second, we would expect some degree of functional convergence in the substantive rules 
among the countries that have adopted the same types of processes of takeover regulation. In 
particular, Armour and Skeel argue that the U.S. model of judge-made law results in 
managers and boards prevailing in the outcome of regulation of hostile takeovers. Using the 
U.K. example prior to the adoption of the UK Takeover Code, they argue that a similar result 
can be seen when the judiciary is the arbiter of takeover disputes in hostile takeovers. Thus, 
we would expect that jurisdictions or legal transplants that have adopted the U.S.-model of 
takeover dispute resolution are likely to reach the same results. However, drawing from the 
evidence pertaining to our Asian jurisdictions (Korea, China, and Japan) that have adapted 
the U.S. model of settling hostile takeover disputes by the courts, we find that the legal 
                                                 
Continuing Concern for Minority Shareholders, in UMAKANTH VAROTTIL & WAI YEE WAN, COMPARATIVE 
TAKEOVER REGULATION: GLOBAL AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES  281-283 (2017); Stephen Choi, The Future 
Direction of Takeover Law in Korea 7 JOURNAL OF KOREAN LAW 25 (2007), 34-35. For India, see Marianne 
Bertrand, Paras Mehta and Sendhil Mullainathan, Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business 
Groups, 117 Q. J. ECON. 121 (2002). Moreover, apart from holding absolute control, a dominant shareholder 
may, in certain circumstances, be able to exercise control while holding only a fraction of the equity, through the 
mechanism referred to as the “controlling-minority structure” (CMS). See, Sang Yop Kang, Transplanting a 
Poison Pill to Controlling Shareholder Regimes—Why It Is So Difficult, 33 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 619, 640 
(2013). 
11  Ventoruzzo, supra note 3. 
12  Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2. 
13  Chao Xi, The Political Economy of Takeover Regulation: What Does the Mandatory Bid Rule in China 
Tell Us?, [2015] J.B.L 142. 
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exportation of the takeover regulation has led only to somewhat superficial formal but not 
functional convergence of regulation.  
 
In reflecting on the two puzzles, we seek to answer the following questions. First, what are 
interest groups that are relevant in the choice of initial takeover regulation in the Asian 
economies?14 Second, after such selection has occurred, what are reasons for the continued 
lack of functional convergence between the takeover law and regulation of the exporting 
(U.S. and the U.K.) and recipient countries (the Asian economies)? Third, are there any 
unintended consequences of legal transplantation of the U.S. and/or U.K. model of takeover 
regulation in the recipient countries (the Asian economies)?  
 
Armour and Skeel’s theory of interest group politics in takeover regulation is both helpful 
and incomplete when it is extended to the Asian legal transplants.15 The beneficial aspect of 
the theory is that the broader narrative on the role of the various actors in the market for 
corporate control may explain why the takeover rules developed in advanced economies often 
operate quite differently in the recipient countries due to the differences in the legal 
institutions supporting such regulation. Furthermore, there are important differences even 
among jurisdictions that are recipients of transplants from the U.S. and the U.K. The theory 
provides an elegant framework to examine the factors that led to the design of takeover 
regulation in each of our Asian jurisdictions. 
 
At the same time, there are significant limitations in applying Armour and Skeel’s theory to 
our Asian jurisdictions. First, substantial differences are inherent in the manner in which 
takeover regulation emerged in the U.S. and the U.K. on the one hand, and in our Asian 
jurisdictions on the other. Armour and Skeel are essentially concerned with indigenous 
development of takeover regulation purely based on local factors, without having regard to 
cross-country diffusion of regulations. On the other hand, the narrative in Asia is rather 
different in that the jurisdictions therein are concerned with incorporation of takeover rules 
from other jurisdictions and adapting them to suit local circumstances. Here, the political 
economy implications are felt in choices such as which established jurisdiction should one 
borrow takeover regulation from, and what changes or modifications need to be made to 
implement them in an effective manner.  
 
Second, Armour and Skeel’s theory is developed in the context of advanced economies with 
dispersed shareholdings, without taking into account the influence of controlling shareholders 
found in economies with closely-held shareholdings. We argue that controlling shareholders 
                                                 
14 Interest groups could either be institutional shareholders (for example, in the U.K.), target’s 
management (for instance, in the U.S.), or controlling shareholders (in several jurisdictions continenental 
Europe and Asia, including business families and the state). The role of interest groups may vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and in many cases it might be difficult to identify precisely the interest groups who 
have influenced the shape of takeover regulation. In other cases, regulation may be driven by policy makers and 
academics without being resisted by the business community. 
15  One scholar notes a similar outcome in the context of European jurisdictions, finding that the 
evaluation of those jurisdictions is “both consistent with and contrary to Armour and Skeel’s analysis”. See, 
Ventoruzzo, supra note 3, at 137.  
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play an important role in shaping the outcome of takeover regulation, and this is true of all of 
our six Asian jurisdictions. While controlling shareholders do not find a part in the Armour 
and Skeel story, they play a lead role in shaping takeover regulation in Asia. Third, and 
related to the above, Armour and Skeel construct their theory around two of the most active 
takeover markets in the world. On the other hand, Asia has witnessed a sparse incidence of 
hostile takeovers. The usual explanation for this phenomenon relates to the presence of 
concentrated shareholdings. But, matters are more complex and hostile takeovers have not 
built up any momentum even in those companies in Asian jurisdictions such as Japan that are 
dispersedly held. It does not thereby imply that a discussion of hostile takeovers and the role 
of the target’s board in setting up defences is irrelevant (or even less relevant) in the Asian 
jurisdictions. The analysis is imperative given that there continues to be incidences, albeit 
occasional ones, of hostile takeovers in Asia that continue to capture a great deal of attention, 
with the Asian jurisdictions lacking a uniform approach. 
 
Fourth, the differing roles of the state are also relevant in the development of takeover 
regulation between advanced and emerging economies. In advanced economies of the U.S. 
and the U.K., judicial decisions and the U.K. Takeover Code have respectively pre-empted 
the need for legislation governing hostile takeovers. However, in several economies, the state 
often has an interest in playing a far more active role: the selection (and subsequently 
adaptation) of a model of regulation serves a signal of its commitment to a free market and 
open economy and the importance of investor protection. At the same time, the adaptation of 
the U.S. and the U.K. models in their implementation to different Asian jurisdictions not only 
cause divergence among jurisdictions, but the adaptations are often driven by the need of the 
state to play to local influences, primarily that of controlling shareholders. 
 
In this article, we argue that takeover regulation in Asia must be viewed through a different 
lens altogether.16 It is true that Asian regulators have cross-referred, arguably excessively, to 
the U.S. and the U.K. while framing their takeover regulation. But, a deeper analysis of the 
factors that were at play when choices were (and are continuing to be) made will enable a 
more informed appreciation of the manner in which such takeover regulation is likely to be 
implemented.  
 
We contribute to the existing literature on comparative takeover regulation, corporate 
governance and comparative law in the following respects. First, we highlight the trends in 
the importation of takeover regulation by Asian countries from the U.S. and the U.K., 
although the presence of entirely different shareholding structures and legal institutions raise 
significant questions about the efficacy of the transplantation of such a legal framework. 
Second, we seek to extend the scope of the comparative study of hostile takeover regime, and 
the influence of various interest groups in shaping takeover regulation, to a wider set of 
                                                 
16  It might very well be that Asia as a whole cannot be viewed through a single lens, and that there needs 
to be “jurisdiction-specific lenses”. On this point in relation to the power of shareholders in Asian jurisdictions, 
see, Dan. W. Puchniak, Multiple faces of shareholder power in Asia: complexity revealed, in JENNIFER G. HILL 
& RANDALL S. THOMAS (EDS.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER (2015). 
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countries in Asia, than examined by current scholarship. Third, our study is relevant to 
emerging countries considering their reforms of takeover regulation.  
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Part II discusses the existing theoretical 
framework in comparative takeover regulation to establish where our study fits in the 
scholarship relating to the political economy of takeovers. Part III explains why hostile 
takeovers are important in Asia, notwithstanding the landscape of concentrated shareholdings 
or (in the case of Japan) stable shareholdings. Part IV examines the evolution and design of 
takeover regulation in each of our Asian jurisdictions with a view to ascertaining the possible 
influences of various interest groups on regulatory outcomes. Part V explores the key lessons 
and implications that emerge from our study of six Asian jurisdictions, and Part VI 
concludes.  
 
 
II. ESTABLISHING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARATIVE TAKEOVER 
REGULATION  
 
A. The Theory of Interest Group Politics in Takeover Regulation in the U.S. and the U.K. 
 
In their influential work, Armour and Skeel argue that the reasons for the differences in the 
regulation of hostile takeovers in the U.S. and the U.K. are based on interest group politics or 
political economy.17 Specifically, the differences arise from the varying influence of the 
powerful lobbying groups, namely the institutional shareholders in the U.K. and the managers 
of firms in the U.S., which affect the mode and the content of the regulation.18 Institutional 
shareholders in the U.K. opted for self-regulation and collectively acted together to write the 
U.K. Takeover Code, of which the board neutrality rule is one of the most prominent 
features.19 Thus, in so doing, they pre-empted the possibility of state-imposed or legislative 
measures.20 The U.K. also had a closely-knit body of finance and legal professionals within 
the City of London and who were willing to buy into the concept of self-regulation that is 
essential for the operation of the U.K. Code.21 Their account of takeover regulation is broadly 
consistent with the existing scholarship on influence of institutional shareholders on other 
aspects of corporate governance, such as the fact that they were also instrumental in 
procuring that the listing rules of London Stock Exchange subject all large transactions to 
shareholder approval in the 1970s.22 
                                                 
17  Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1771. See also, Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2, at 230-31. 
18  Id. 
19  UK Takeover Code, § 21. The other is the mandatory bid rule. Id., § 9. The mandatory bid rule 
obligates acquirers who obtain effective control over the target company to make an offer to the remaining 
shareholders of the target to acquire their shares. Umakanth Varottil, Comparative Takeover Regulation and the 
Concept of ‘Control’, [2015] SING. J.L.S 208, 209. 
20  Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1771-72. 
21  Id. 
22  Paul Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom in Randall Thomas & Jennifer Hill, Research 
Handbook on Shareholder Power 363 (2015).  
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In contrast, in the U.S., institutional shareholders neither had the same influence nor held the 
same levels of stock in the publicly listed companies as those in the U.K. Instead, as Armour 
and Skeel argue, corporate directors and managers exerted much greater influence on the 
development of takeover law.23 Federal legislation, principally in the form of the Williams 
Act of 1968, which provides for shareholding disclosure requirements and prevents bidders 
from using unfair or coercive tactics, was ostensibly enacted to “level the playing field” 
between bidders and target managers, but it instead had the effect of favoring target 
managers.24  With respect to state law, in Delaware, corporate directors and managers litigate 
before the courts against the hostile bidders, and thus through repeat litigation, are able to 
convince the judiciary to lay down pro-managerial decisions.25  
 
Armour and Skeel turn to the position in the U.K. prior to the emergence of the U.K. 
Takeover Code as an instance to demonstrate that the process of takeover regulation affects 
the shape of substantive rules.26 Prior to the U.K. Takeover Code, when the Takeover Panel 
had not yet been formed, all disputes relating to takeovers were resolved before the courts. 
The corpus of case law from the English courts of that era shows that the courts generally 
upheld management’s decisions that were entered into in good faith and with a legitimate 
business purpose, even if such decisions had the effect of frustrating a hostile bidder.27 Thus, 
they argue that “using litigation to resolve such matters involves a structural bias in 
favor of the directors”,28 and that in response to the case law, institutional shareholders in UK 
chose to band together to write the Takeover Code. While institutional shareholders must 
have been aware of such bias in the U.S., the situation could not be replicated due to the 
presence of federal legislation which precluded the forming of such links among the 
institutional shareholders and which pre-empted self-regulation by the market players.29 The 
question that arises is whether the experiences of the U.S. and the U.K. in takeover regulation 
are confined to their peculiar political economy and whether they can be generalized outside 
these two jurisdictions and applied to Asia. The next sub-Part discusses the work of 
comparative takeover scholars that seeks to extend the theory of interest group politics in the 
context of takeover regulation outside of the U.S. and the U.K.  
 
B. The Extension of Interest Group Politics outside the U.S. and the U.K. to Asia 
 
Following from Armour and Skeel’s work, comparative takeover scholars have sought to 
extend their theory of interest group politics outside of the U.S. and the U.K. as well as to 
other tools of takeover regulation (such as the mandatory bid rule) that are beyond the 
regulation of hostile takeovers. In the context of advanced economies, in Europe, Ventoruzzo 
                                                 
23  Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1780-1784. 
24  Id., at 1755. 
25  Id., at 1781. 
26  Id., at 1782-1784. 
27  Id., at 1782-84. 
28  Id., at 1784. 
29  Id. 
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argues that their narrative of takeover regulation can be broadly applied to the rest of Europe 
(outside of the U.K.), although he argues that the effect of the U.K.-style takeover regulation 
(particularly the mandatory bid rule and the board neutrality rule) has led to unintended 
consequences in Italy due to the varied ownership structure in that jurisdiction.30 Armour, 
Jacobs and Milhaupt extended the theory of interest group politics to Japan, another advanced 
economy, and broadly discuss the implications for China, India and Brazil.31 In the context of 
emerging economies, in the case of the Chinese mandatory bid rule, Xi argues that the theory 
of interest group politics may be extended to that country, but that it needs refinement to take 
into account the state regulator’s private interests.32  
 
However, what is missing in the current scholarship is an updated discussion on whether the 
interest group politics theory, which is developed in the context of advanced economies of 
the U.S. and the U.K., can be generalized in their application to their legal transplants in 
significant economies within Asia (in addition to Japan and China discussed in the 
literature).33 Asia is fast becoming a significant player in the global M&A market,34 and the 
U.S. and the U.K. have been key exporters of their mode of takeover regulation. In this, we 
use the case studies of our six Asian jurisdictions (Japan, Korea, China, India, Hong Kong 
and Singapore) to test the theory.  
 
As outlined in Section I above, there are two puzzles in using Armour and Skeel’s theory to 
fully account for the narrative of takeover regulation in our Asian economies. First, all of the 
Asian jurisdictions (except for Japan) are dominated by public companies with concentrated 
shareholdings, and yet most of the Asian jurisdictions adopt the UK-based board neutrality 
rule (India, Hong Kong and Singapore) or a weaker version thereof (China and Korea), where 
concentrated shareholdings are the norm. Second, there is no functional convergence in the 
substantive rules among the countries that have adopted the same types of processes of 
takeover regulation.  
 
In reflecting upon the two puzzles, we examine the demand for, and supply of, takeover 
regulation. The demand comes from the interest groups, including the relevant shareholders 
of the publicly listed companies, corporate managers and directors; the supply side comes 
from the institutions responsible for the enactment of the law and regulation, such as 
legislature, judiciary, takeover panels (or their equivalents) and other agencies (such as self-
regulatory bodies comprising market participants).35  
 
                                                 
30  Ventoruzzo, supra note 3, at 141. 
31  Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2. 
32  Xi, supra note 13. 
33  On a related note, given that a decade has elapsed since the publication of Armour and Skeel’s seminal 
work, this may be an opportune moment to take stock of the broader implications of their theoretical framework 
to understanding takeover regulation as well as its application to countries around the world, and more 
specifically in Asia. 
34  See references in Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan, Comparative Takeover Regulation: The 
Background to Connecting Asia and the West, in UMAKANTH VAROTTIL & WAI YEE WAN (EDS.), COMPARATIVE 
TAKEOVER REGULATION: GLOBAL AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 6-9 (2017). 
35  See, Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2, at 223-24. 
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On the demand side, the interest group politics theory, as conceptualized by Armour and 
Skeel, was developed with reference to advanced economies and had dispersed shareholdings 
in mind. Thus, their focus is on the role that the institutional minority shareholders may (or 
may not have) played. They did not take into account the influence controlling shareholders, 
which are not as relevant in the context of the U.S. and the U.K. Yet, as demonstrated in Part 
III below, the influence of the controlling shareholders needs to be given adequate attention 
due to the predominance of these shareholders in Asia. The absence of strong minority 
institutional shareholders may not necessarily lead to the choice of the U.S. model. Scholars 
have demonstrated the influence of the controlling shareholders in the development of a 
separate but closely related rule in takeover regulation, that is, the mandatory bid rule. In 
relation to India and Singapore, each of us has separately argued that controlling shareholders 
(being the state or the families) are influential in the selection and application of the 
mandatory bid rule which may ostensibly favour minority shareholders in the U.K., but 
actually operates to reinforce control by the controlling shareholders in both countries.36 In 
the case of Japan, “stable shareholders” play a significant role in maintaining incumbency 
within firms.37 Often considered to carry a shareholding pattern similar to that of the U.S. and 
the U.K., scholars have predicted the rise of successful hostile takeovers in Japan.38 However, 
their prediction has not materialized, and it would appear that there are other factors at play, 
particularly the presence of stable shareholders.39 These stable shareholders have an 
important role in influencing the outcome of the takeover contests, often in favour of 
directors and management.40 
 
We then focus on the supply side of rule production, that is, the role of the state and the legal 
institutions in takeover regulation. Armour and Skeel have argued that in the U.K. and the 
U.S., the U.K. Takeover Code and judicial lawmaking have respectively pre-empted the 
requirement for legislation. However, the relative neutral position adopted by the U.K. and 
the states in the U.S. (with the exception of some of the states which have put in place anti-
                                                 
36   For India, see, Umakanth Varottil, The Nature of the Market for Corporate Control in India, in 
VAROTTIL & WAN, supra note 34, at 378. For Singapore, see, Wai Yee Wan, Legal Transplantation of UK-Style 
of Takeover Regulation in Singapore”, in VAROTTIL & WAN, supra note 34, at 431-433. 
37  E.g. see Masao Nakamura, The Security Market and the Changing Government Role in Japan, 5 ASIAN 
EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 388, 397-399 (2016), and discussion in Part III(D) below. Although 
their presence is usually counted towards dispersed shareholding in companies, the stable shareholders enjoy 
financial and non-financial relationships with target firms that lead them to respond to a takeover by acting in 
favor of management. See, Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile Takeovers in 
Japan: Bidder Beware, in VAROTTIL & WAN, supra note 34, at 252-53 (a longer version of this chapter is in 
publication in the form of Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile Takeovers in 
Japan: Bidder Beware, 14 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2830286). 
38  Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2; W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS 239 (1991); 
Ronald J. Gilson, The Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, [2004] COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 21, 22; 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
2171, 2173-74 (2005). 
39  See, Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 243-45.  
40  Id. 
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takeover statutes)41 does not necessarily find place in many of the economies in Asia. We 
highlight one possibility, which is that in some economies, the state has a special interest in 
signaling its commitment to an open economy and the protection of investors.  
 
Again, with reference to the closely connected literature on the mandatory bid rule, we have 
seen that emerging countries are also influenced by other interests. In China, Chao Xi has 
argued that the interest group theory should take into account private interests of the Chinese 
securities regulator in driving state-led acquisitions, as evidenced from the shift in approach 
in the transition from a planned economy, which is administratively-driven, to a market 
economy where the securities markets play a much more important role.42 Similarly, Huang 
and Chen have argued that the extensive and liberal exemptions to the mandatory bid rule 
granted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) demonstrates the 
compromise reached: the interest of the state in encouraging takeovers but also at the same 
time, signals its commitment to protecting minority shareholders by ensuring they obtain the 
control premium.43 In Korea, the mandatory bid rule, which was put in place in 1997, was 
repealed quickly in 1998 in light of the Asian financial crisis, in view of not only opposition 
from Korean entrepreneurs, but also the International Monetary Fund and International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, as such rule was seen as blocking takeover bids of 
financially distressed firms.44 
 
Having considered the existing literature on comparative takeover regulation, we now explain 
how our study fits into and extends the same. First, our study contributes to the determinants 
of takeover regulation in Asia, which have, until recently45 received very little attention from 
a broader comparative perspective. Second, our study offers a cautionary tale on the 
unintended consequences of legal transplantation. It is something of a truism that any choice 
of legal rule or reform must be sensitive to local conditions and should take account of 
different implementing environments. Legal concepts tend to behave differently in diverse 
jurisdictions and the importation of a new concept may have unintended consequences for the 
rest of the body of law.46 Thus, we show that the adoption of one aspect of takeover 
                                                 
41  For evidence that the states’ anti-takeover provisions do not affect firms’ decision to incorporate, see 
Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover 
Protection?, 22(2) JLEO 340 (2006).  
42  Xi, supra note 13. 
43  Robin Hui Huang & Juan Chen, Takeover Regulation in China: Striking a Balance Between Takeover 
Contestability and Shareholder Protection, in VAROTTIL & WAN, supra note 34, at 222-23. See also, Wei Cai, 
The Mandatory Bid Rule in China, 12 EBOR 653, 665-68 (2011). However, at the same time, we note that the 
liberal granting of exemptions by CSRC may simply reflect the fact that the mandatory bid rule is not enforced 
in China and that such exemptions may ultimately harm minority shareholders. As such, these exemptions may 
not conclusively indicate that the CSRC is protective of shareholders’ interests. We are indebted to Xingxing Li 
for drawing our attention to the alternative interpretation of the grant of exemptions to the mandatory bid rule.  
44  Rho, supra note 10, at 293. See also, Hwa-Jin Kim, The Market for Corporate Control in Korea, in 
HWA-JIN KIM (ED.), KOREAN BUSINESS LAW (2012). 
45  See, VAROTTIL & WAN, supra note 34. 
46  See Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 9; John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias 
Siems, How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and 
Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (2009); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law 
or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MLR 11 (1998). 
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regulation (being the regulation of hostile takeovers) may not actually have the effect that is 
intended due to the absence (or presence) of other legal institutions.47  Third, our study offers 
some lessons relating to the “legal origins” strain of literature,48 which proffers that the 
degree of investor rights are influenced by the legal tradition of the countries and outside 
interest group politics. We argue that at least in the context of takeover regulation, the legal 
origins hypothesis has no support given that countries do change their regulation over time. 
 
 
III. WHY REGULATION OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS MATTERS IN ASIA  
 
A. Ownership Patterns and Hostile Takeovers 
 
An active hostile takeover market can prevail only if two key elements are present: a 
favourable shareholding structure49 and depressed share prices relative to the asset values.50 
The latter is largely a function of the markets and business cycles. While the shareholding 
structures of companies within Asian economies are largely concentrated, we argue that 
having an optimal takeover regulation matters for several reasons.  
 
First, as the literature on shareholding structures in Asia points out,51 widely held companies 
do exist in these jurisdictions, and indeed such companies are vulnerable to hostile takeovers. 
In other words, it is not the overall concentration of shareholdings in a jurisdiction that 
matters, but the individual, granular, company-wise approach that is important. Even though 
shareholdings on average may be concentrated (particularly in comparison with the Anglo-
American situation), individual companies may be dispersedly held, thereby exposing them 
                                                 
47  See generally on the role of existing legal norms in shaping subsequent legal developments Spamann, 
supra note 9. See also, William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
SOCIETY 203 (2005); William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
PLURALISM 1 (2005); David Cabrelli & Mathias Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins and Transplants in 
Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analysis, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 109 (2015). 
48  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, 42 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes 
& Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); and Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 
58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000) (attributing the scope of the capital market to the type of legal system used in a 
country and the level of legal protection for investors: common law countries have the strongest legal 
protections of investors, while civil law countries have the weakest protections).  
49  See Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2, at 222. 
50  John C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender 
Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (1984), at 1163 (explaining the disciplinary 
hypothesis where bidder pays a premium over market price because the assets are not optimally utilised). 
51  The literature on shareholding structures in all of our Asian jurisdictions in the context of takeover 
regulation can be found in VAROTTIL & WAN, supra note 34. For China, see, Huang & Chen, supra note 43, at 
214-16; for Japan, see, Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 250; for Korea, see, Rho, supra note 10, at 
281-83 (on the use of controlling minority shareholder structures among the chaebols or conglomerates owned 
by controlling family members); for India, see, Varottil, supra note 36, at 373-77; for Hong Kong, see, David C. 
Donald, Evolutionary Development in Hong Kong of Transplanted UK-Origin Takeover Rules, in VAROTTIL & 
WAN, supra note 36, at 391-93; for Singapore, see, Wan, supra note 36, at 428-31. 
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to the specter of a hostile takeover. A regime on hostile takeovers will likely affect a non-
trivial number of firms in Asia.  
 
Second, even in the case of controlled companies, if there is more than one significant 
blockholder, and no single blockholder controls a majority of the voting shares, the company 
continues be exposed to hostile takeovers. As shown in sub-part 2 below, the number of such 
companies is not insignificant in Asia.  
 
Third, there is some evidence of gradual diffusion of shareholdings, which makes it vital to 
attain the optimal balance of takeover regulation before the market players’ interests become 
too vested in a diffused shareholders’ model. Despite the lack of evidence of a vibrant market 
for corporate control in Asia and pessimism for such a market in the future, it would be 
imprudent for policy-makers and regulators to assume a continuation of the status quo. They 
must instead maintain a state of preparedness by designing a hostile takeover regime that 
bears clarity and certainty. 
 
B. Widely-held Companies and Evidence of Ownership Dispersion 
 
When ownership is dispersed in companies, they could become vulnerable to hostile 
takeovers. Widely held companies are not the norm in Asia, but they do exist. In a study by 
Carney & Child52 of the largest 200 companies in East Asian countries by market 
capitalization for which the ultimate ownership can be traced (and this study includes all of 
our Asian countries, except for India and China), as at 2008, Japan was found to have the 
largest number of widely held corporations (57.4%) followed by Korea (28.9%).53 Singapore 
and Hong Kong have among the lowest number of widely held corporations at 8.4% and 
6.3%.54 The findings of the authors of the Comparative Takeover Regulation are generally 
consistent with Carney & Child.55  
 
We now turn to India and China, which are not covered by Carney & Child. In the case of 
India, one of us has found that for companies included in the three major indices, the CNX 
Nifty, the CNX 100, and the CNX 500, there exist companies (albeit in the minority) in 
which either the controlling shareholders hold less than 25% or they have no controlling 
shareholders, which are thereby exposed to hostile takeovers.56 This list comprises 16% of 
                                                 
52   Richard Carney & Travers Child, Changes to the ownership and control of East Asian corporations 
between 1996 and 2008: The primacy of politics, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 494 (2008). 
53  Id., at 505 (Table 4, Panel A (at the 10% cutoff level)). In their study, widely held companies are 
companies which have no controlling shareholders, defined at the levels of 10% or 20% of the voting rights. The 
number of companies for each country, however, differs as only the companies whose ultimate ownership can 
be traced are in the sample. For other studies on the dispersion of sharholdings in Japan, see Puchniak & 
Nakahigashi, supra note 37, footnote 2. 
54  Id., at 505. 
55  See supra note 51. 
56  Varottil, supra note 36, at 376. The three indices represent the top 50, top 100 and top 500 companies 
respectively in terms of market capitalization among those listed on the National Stock Exchange of India 
Limited. Id. 
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the companies in the CNX Nifty, 9% companies in the CNX 100 and 6% companies in the 
CNX 500.57 The larger companies in the CNX Nifty are more likely to be widely held, as 
compared with the smaller companies. With the preliminary indications of some dispersion of 
shareholdings and greater participation by outside shareholders, this could render the issue of 
hostile bids more important.58   
 
In the case of China, since the 2005 Share Split Reform [Guquan Fenzhi Gaige],59 the level 
of ownership concentration, which has been predominantly held by the state, has been 
reduced. The average concentration of shareholding has reduced from over 40% in 2004 to 
36% in 2014.60 Even in China, where hostile takeovers are thought to be difficult to 
achieve,61 the hostile battle for control of Vanke, the largest property developer in China, 
demonstrates the possibility of a widely held company being a target for hostile bids.62 A 
discussion of the Vanke takeover contest is useful as it is not only the most recent high-
profile case Asia, but it also demonstrates the peculiar nature of hostile takeovers in Asian 
jurisdictions, and also the somewhat unconventional defensive tools employed by companies 
to fend off raiders. 
 
In that case, prior to 2015, Vanke was widely held, with its largest shareholder, being the 
state-run conglomerate, China Resources holding 17%.63 The Baoneng group, a much lesser-
known firm which has acquired, among others, an insurer, amassed shares in Vanke, 
increasing its stake to 24.4% by December 2015, surpassing the shareholding held by China 
Resources.64 Vanke’s management promptly declared the shareholdings by Baoneng to be 
unwelcome. Vanke began undertaking defensive measures, by calling for a trading 
suspension and declaring Anbang, an insurer, to be a white knight.65 However, the support of 
Anbang (which held 7.0%) was insufficient.66 During the six-month trading suspension in the 
Vanke stock in the first half of 2016, the company looked for a white knight, which took the 
form of Shenzhen Metro, a property conglomerate.67 Vanke proposed to issue shares to 
Shenzhen Metro, in exchange for the injection of its assets, so as make Shenzhen Metro its 
largest shareholder, thereby massively diluting Baoneng and China Resources.68 
                                                 
57  Id. 
58  Id., at 377. 
59  Huang & Chen, supra note 43, at 215; Robin Huang Robin Huang & Juan Chen, The Rise of Hostile 
Takeovers and Defensive Measures in China: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, EUROPEAN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW (forthcoming) (copy on file with the authors), .  
60  Table 1, Robin Huang & Juan Chen, The Rise of Hostile Takeovers and Defensive Measures in China: 
Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, id.  
61  Id.  
62  Id. See also, The five things you need to know about the battle of Vanke, SCMP (Jan. 16 2017) 
(hereinafter “The five things”). 
63  Tom Mitchell & Ben Bland, Vanke’s tussel points to China’s first hostile takeover battle, FINANCIAL. 
TIMES (Dec. 28 2015) . 
64  Id. (table showing Vanke’s largest shareholders as at Dec. 18, 2015 wherein China Resource’s 
shareholding was at 17.3%).  
65  Id.  
66  Id. 
67  The five things, supra note 62.  
68  Id.  
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Unsurprisingly, both Baoneng and China Resources opposed the transaction and Vanke 
ultimately withdraw its plans in the face of such shareholder opposition.69 In the meantime, in 
June 2016, Baoneng openly demanded the removal of the founder-director and other board 
members of Vanke, arguing, among other things, that the founder was over-compensated.70 
 
When the suspension on the trading of Vanke shares was lifted, Baoneng raised its stake to 
25%.71 In August 2016, a new player, Evergrande Group joined in the potential takeover fray, 
when it purchased a 4.7% stake in Vanke, which increased to 14.1% in November 2016.72 
Ultimately, the Chinese securities regulator stepped in and criticized the acquirers who make 
highly leveraged takeovers.73 In December 2016 and January 2017, Evergrande and Baoneng 
respectively declared that each of them had no intention of taking over Vanke.74 In March 
2017, Evergrande Group transferred the voting rights in Vanke to Shenzhen Metro for a 
year75 and in June 2017, ultimately sold its shareholdings to Shenzhen Metro.76 Those 
holdings of voting rights, together with the sale of the shareholdings by China Resources to 
Shenzhen Metro and other acquisitions, meant that Shenzhen Metro held 29.4% of Vanke, 
surpassing Baoneng’s shareholding.77  
 
While the takeover had ended with regulatory intervention and without either Baoneng or 
Evergrande succeeding, the case illustrates how a widely held company was vulnerable to 
takeovers. The company did not have any embedded takeover defenses in its constitution, and 
the only available defence was that of a white knight.78 Ultimately, it is the unorthodox tools 
such as trading suspension,79 intervention by the Chinese regulators, and the assumption of 
control by a Chinese state-owned enterprise that helped the target stave off a hostile acquirer. 
These are entirely incongruent with the classic scenarios played out in hostile takeovers in the 
U.S. and the U.K.  
 
C. Presence of More than One Significant Shareholder 
 
Majority-controlled companies and dispersedly held companies are not the only forms of 
companies. Other intermediate forms of shareholding exist as well. If there is more than one 
                                                 
69  China Vanke drops white knight rail deal, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016). 
70  Id. 
71  The five things, supra note 62. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Vanke's year at war, SCMP (Dec. 24, 2016); Vanke sues over 'invalid' Baoneng stake, SCMP (Feb. 8, 
2017). 
75  Shenzhen Metro set to become Vanke’s largest shareholder, SCMP (June 7, 2017). 
76  Shenzhen Metro to become biggest China Vanke shareholder as Evergrande cashes out, SCMP (Jun. 9, 
2017). 
77  Shenzhen Metro to raise stake in China Vanke to nearly 30% with $4bn share purchase from 
Evergrande, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 12, 2017).  
78  Huang & Chen, supra, note 60.  
79  See, Xingxing Li, Institutional Activism and China’s Under-enforced Corporate Governance Doctrines: 
Reflection on China’s Takeover Regulation in the Aftermath of the Failed Baoneng/Vanke Takeover (draft 
paper on file with the authors). 
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significant shareholder and no single shareholder controls a majority of the voting shares in a 
company, the presence of more than one blockholder will make it difficult for any single 
blockholder to control the board. 
 
There is evidence that such companies exist in almost all of our Asian jurisdictions. In India, 
based on the companies included in the three major indices,80 there are a number of 
companies where the controlling shareholders hold less than a majority of shares, but outside  
shareholders or groups of shareholders hold at least 15% shares in the aggregate, with each 
individual shareholder or group holding at least 5%.81 They constitute 12% companies in the 
CNX Nifty, 15% companies in the CNX 100 (15%) and 27% companies in the CNX 500 
(27%).82 Despite the presence of controlling shareholders, such companies may be exposed to 
unwelcome acquirers. 
 
In Singapore, the data from Carney & Child show that, as of 2008, 75.9% of the listed 
companies in Singapore have the presence of a single ultimate owner.83 There still remains a 
significant proportion of companies with no single ultimate owner, for which an acquirer may 
still be able to succeed in a takeover offer that is opposed by some large shareholders. Thus, 
the board neutrality rule will limit the potential for these large shareholders to procure the 
board to prevent bona fide bids from succeeding; this fills a regulatory gap by benefitting 
non-controlling shareholders, even among companies are not regarded as widely held.  
 
D. Ownership and Control in the Future 
 
As we have seen, hostile takeovers are a distinct possibility in Asia if the shareholding 
changes continue to move in the direction of greater dispersion. Although Hong Kong and 
Singapore are exceptions in that they demonstrate greater concentration,84 China and India 
have shown evidence of greater shareholder dispersion in recent years.85 It would be critical 
to put in place an optimal takeover regulatory framework before shareholdings become more 
widely dispersed and where the controllers begin to exercise their vested interests in retaining 
control. It is precisely because the number of companies that are subject to hostile bids is 
small that regulators can have more leeway in determining the appropriate legal framework. 
A U.K.-based board neutrality rule or a rule that limits takeover defences will be difficult to 
                                                 
80  See supra note 56. 
81  Varottil, supra note 36, at 377. 
82  Id. 
83  Carney & Child, supra note 52, at 508 (Table 8). Following Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry 
H.P. Lang, The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 93 (2000), 
companies with single ultimate owners are defined as companies where (a) there is a single owner who has 
majority control or (b) there is a single owner holding at least 10% of the voting rights and there is no second 
shareholder holding at least 10%. In the case of (b), if there is a second shareholder that holds at least 10%, it 
may be more difficult for the first owner to control the board.  
84  For Hong Kong, see, Donald, supra note 51, at 392; for Singapore, see, Wan, supra note 36, at 431-
433. 
85  For China, see, Huang & Chen, supra note 59, Figures 1 and 2; for India, see, Varottil, supra note 36, 
at 375-76. At the same time, it is necessary to note that the available empirical evidence is not conclusive, nor 
does it suggest an irreversible trend that ownership will continue to become dispersed over time. 
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be put in place once a large number of companies are potentially subject to hostile bids and 
the insiders view the rule as a threat to their continued survival. The concern is not trivial. 
Huang and Chen report that after the attempted hostile attempt by Baoneng to acquire Vanke, 
up to 20 companies have put in place anti-takeover provisions in their constitutions by 
August 2016 to repel future hostile acquirers.86 Although it would be difficult to generalize in 
the broader Asian context, the threat could be real for a handful of companies that are 
exposed to hostile takeovers, however small that number may be.  
 
Other factors too play a role in determining the future of hostile takeovers and their 
regulation in Asia. Japan represents a unique case and serves as an illustration on the political 
force of labour and why timing may matter. Puchniak and Nakahigashi have demonstrated 
that labour is a powerful political force and employee protection (not least in the form of the 
life-time employment phenomenon that marks the Japanese corporate landscape) has been an 
important force that influences the stable shareholders to be in their side.87 Thus, even for the 
rest of Asia, if hostile takeovers are seen as precursors for widespread layoff, it may be 
difficult for the regulators to implement a board neutrality rule that enables a free market for 
corporate control. While it can be argued that the protection of stakeholders, including 
employees, can be analytically separate from the regulation of hostile bids, Japan has shown 
that both facets of the policy are perceived politically as closely linked together. In that sense, 
elements of corporate culture have an important role to play in the design and implementation 
of takeover regulation.88 
 
Having considered the shareholding structures in Asia and debated the possibility of hostile 
takeovers in the region, we now analyze the evolution of takeover regulation in our six Asian 
jurisdictions by examining various factors, including interest group dynamics, which have 
been responsible for giving shape to the regulation. This will enable us to analyze the broader 
trends in Asian takeover regulation. 
 
 
IV. EVOLUTION AND DESIGN OF HOSTILE TAKEOVER REGIMES IN ASIA 
 
In this Part, we analyze the broad contours of takeover regulation in our Asian jurisdictions to 
identify any patterns. In doing so, we also adopt the approach of Armour and Skeel in 
ascertaining the rule making process in each of the jurisdictions as a means to help explain 
the substantive regulatory outcomes.89 Such an analysis will also illuminate our 
understanding of the political economy of takeover regulation in those jurisdictions by 
studying the influence of various interest groups. 
                                                 
86  Huang & Chen, supra note 59, at 9, citing Stock C (2016) 反收购防卫过当 监管层忙喊停 
(Fanshougou Fangwei Guodang Jianguanceng Mang Hanting, Regulator Calls off on Excessive Use of 
Takeover Defenses), available at http://company.cnstock.com/company/scpdsy/tcsyrdgs/201608/3887377.htm.. 
87  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 274-77. 
88  For the role of culture in takeover regulation in specific Asian jurisdictions, see, Huang & Cheng, 
supra note 43, at 225 (for China); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 274-77. 
89  See also, Ventoruzzo, supra note 3, at 136. 
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Interestingly, the legal transplants from the Anglo-American jurisdictions into Asia have 
followed a discernible pattern. Our civil law jurisdictions in Asia, viz., China, Japan and 
Korea, have adopted their regulations governing hostile takeovers either solely from the U.S. 
(Delaware) or through a combination of the U.S. and the U.K. modes of regulation (with 
greater emphasis on the U.S. approach).90 This not only includes granting freedom to the 
target boards to devise defensive mechanisms, at least to some extent, but it also relies 
heavily on the courts to monitor management conduct. On the other hand, our common law 
jurisdictions, viz. India, Hong Kong and Singapore, have largely embraced the strict board 
neutrality rule that is characteristic of the U.K. approach, which leaves the target’s board 
powerless in the wake of a hostile takeover offer, and instead confers the sole decision-
making power upon the shareholders. Moreover, these jurisdictions drastically limit the role 
of the courts in resolving takeover disputes, and instead rely upon a takeover panel or the 
securities regulator to perform that role.91  
 
A study of the nature of regulation as well as the evolution of the takeover regimes in each of 
our jurisdictions will help explain the factors that led to these patterns and provide indications 
regarding the outcome of takeover regulation and the path that is likely to be taken in the 
future. We begin with our civil law jurisdictions, and then deal with the common law 
jurisdictions. 
 
A. The Adoption of Hybrid Regulatory Mechanisms into Civil Law Asia 
 
Our civil law Asian jurisdictions have substantially looked to the U.S. (Delaware) to draw 
inspiration for devising methods to deal with hostile takeovers. While there are some 
indications of cross-referencing to the U.K., they are indeed minimal. As a result, the 
incumbents (i.e., managers and controlling shareholders) are equipped with powers to 
overcome unwelcome raids on their companies. In these regimes, the incumbents have not 
simply relied on concentrated shareholdings or, in the case of Japan, the support of stable 
shareholders, but instead have preferred to incorporate explicit defensive mechanisms as well 
as board freedom (in some cases, subject to concurrence of shareholders) to respond to 
hostile offers.92 However, as we argue in this Part, our civil law jurisdictions have extracted 
                                                 
90  Somewhat similar trends have been found in relation to shareholder derivative actions. See, Dan W. 
Puchniak, The Derivative Action in Asia: A Complex Reality, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2013). 
91  Here, we seek to clarify that the civil law – common law dichotomy plays out somewhat differently in 
the context of takeovers. Although some countries in Asia are generally categorized to be under the civil law 
system and others under the common law heritage, the manner in which takeover laws are developed and 
implemented in these jurisdictions is somewhat ambiguous. For example, all jurisdictions in Asia (regardless of 
the lineage of their legal system) seem to have drawn heavily from the U.S. and the U.K., both of which are 
categorized as common law jurisdictions for purposes of corporate law. See, La Porta, et. al., Law and Finance, 
supra note 48, at 1130. Hence, although we have made the civil law – common law distinction while discussing 
our jurisdictions in this Part, we draw readers’ attention to the fact that the division might amount to one that is 
more of convenience rather than strict principle. 
92  This Part explores in detail the extent of power given to target’s boards, and how they are, in certain 
cases, circumscribed by the need to adhere to the will of the shareholders. 
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their regulatory principles and mechanisms from the Anglo-American viewpoint only at a 
formal level, and that there has not been any form of convergence from a functional 
perspective. This is a result of the interplay of various dominant influences, not least from the 
controlling shareholders and managers. In developing our arguments further, we explore 
some key features of takeover regulation in China, Japan and Korea, examine the manner in 
which they are enforced and then comment on their impact on interest groups, primarily 
controlling shareholders and managers. 
 
1. Limited Applicability of the Board Neutrality Rule 
 
As we have seen,93 the board neutrality rule is the staple ingredient in the regulation of hostile 
takeovers in the U.K., while it is absent in the U.S. Among our civil law jurisdictions in Asia, 
only China has imposed a form of board neutrality rule.94 Although there are some superficial 
similarities with the U.K. position, there are significant differences. For example, it has been 
noted that a board’s defensive measure is proscribed only if it results in any significant effect 
on the assets, liabilities, entitlements or business performances of the company.95 Moreover, 
it only applies in scenarios where a takeover offer has been announced.96 The limited 
application of the rule provides greater leeway to the boards of Chinese companies to respond 
to preserve their position in the wake (or in anticipation) of a hostile takeover attempt. The 
Chinese board neutrality rule is far more circumscribed compared to its U.K. equivalent,97 
and such a selective adaptation will benefit state-owned enterprises and local Chinese 
interests.98 If China has incorporated a limited version of the board neutrality rule, Japan and 
Korea have no such explicit rule.99 In that sense, target boards in all of these three 
jurisdictions are not bound to pass on to the shareholders all the decision-making power in 
                                                 
93  Supra Part IIA. 
94  Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [Measures for Regulating Takeovers of Listed Companies 
(2006 Takeover Measures)] (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 31 July 2006 and 
effective from 1 September 2006, amended in 2008, 2012 and 2014), art. 33. Some have argued that this is due 
to Chinese takeover regime’s historical links with the U.K. Takeover Code through Hong Kong, as several 
members of the drafting committee of the regulations looked to Hong Kong for inspiration. See, Wei, supra note 
43, at 654-55 (2011). This is also due to Hong Kong’s proximity to mainland China and the Chinese regulators’ 
desire for Chinese companies to list in Hong Kong, due to which Hong Kong’s takeover regime became a 
natural example to follow. See, Guanghua Yu, Does One Size Fit All? Transplanting English Takeover Law into 
China, in CHERYL R. LEHMAN, ET. AL (EDS.), CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: DOES ANY SIZE FIT? 49 (2005) 
95  Huang & Chen, supra note 43, at 228.  
96  Id. 
97  Id., at 233. The U.K. rule imposes a blanket ban on frustrating actions of target boards when a takeover 
offer is in the vicinity. 
98  JUAN CHEN, REGULATING THE TAKEOVER OF CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES: DIVERGENCE FROM THE 
WEST 26 (2014). 
99  For Japan, see, ENRICO COLCERA, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN JAPAN: M&AS, HOSTILE 
TAKEOVERS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 215, 233 (2007) (noting that the law has not opted for a board 
neutrality rule). For Korea, see, Rho, supra note 10, at 305 (indicating that some scholars have in fact argued for 
the introduction of a board neutrality rule similar to that of the U.K.). At the same time, courts in Japan have 
deferred to the ability of boards to intervene in takeover offers only in scenarios where shareholders have 
approved the action, thereby indicating the existence of a functional equivalent of the board neutrality rule, 
albeit imposed by court rulings. See infra Part IVA2. 
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the wake of a hostile takeover, but can exercise some amount of leeway to affect the 
outcome.  
 
2. Fiduciary Duties of Directors as the Main Prong 
 
In all of our civil law jurisdictions in Asia, the conduct of the target’s board is judged against 
the duties of directors, which play a major part in the regulation of hostile takeovers. Courts 
and regulatory authorities have sought to establish standards against which the board’s 
actions can be measured. This is similar to the approach adopted in Delaware.100 Although 
this aspect of civil law Asia bears a close comparison with Delaware law, we find that not 
only are there significant differences between the two systems, but target’s management and 
controlling shareholders in civil law Asia are arguably subject to less stringent regulation, 
thereby hindering successful hostile takeovers. 
 
Chinese law requires the target’s board to take decisions in the interests of the company and 
its shareholders.101 However, this is seemingly drafted in general terms and has caused a great 
deal of uncertainty, which has kept open the question of legitimacy of several takeover 
defences.102 As we subsequently discuss, such a duty has not received much exposition from 
the courts or regulatory authorities, which has added to the uncertainty, thereby benefiting the 
incumbents such as controlling shareholders rather than the acquirers. 
 
Among our jurisdictions, the assessment of target responses to hostile takeovers using 
directors’ duties has received the greatest amount of traction in Japan. Historically, when 
targets responded to hostile takeovers by issuing shares to friendly stable shareholders, the 
action was challenged before the Japanese courts, which developed the “primary purpose” 
rule.103 Under this doctrine, courts treat a share issuance to be valid if it was effected to raise 
capital rather than to maintain control.104 Puchniak and Nakahigashi argue that this is very 
different from the “proper purpose” duty imposed under English law,105 and that it set a very 
low bar for directors in Japanese companies.106 
 
This duty has been the subject matter of frenetic developments before both the courts and the 
regulators. In the much-discussed Livedoor case,107 the Tokyo High Court sought to explicitly 
                                                 
100   Jack B. Jacobs, Implementing Japan’s New Anti-Takeover Defense Guidelines—Part 1: Some Lessons 
from Delaware’s Experience in Crafting Fair Takeover Rules, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 323, 327 (2006); Kang, 
supra note 10, at 627-32. 
101  2014 Takeover Measures, art. 8. 
102  Huang & Chen, supra note 43, at 227. 
103  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 263-64. 
104  Id. 
105  The proper purpose rule has been expounded by the English courts in Hogg v. Cramphorn [1967] Ch 
254; Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821; Eclairs Group Ltd v. JKX Oil & Gas plc 
[2015] Bus LR 1395. 
106  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 264-65. 
107  See, Hiroshi Oda, Case No. 30 – Corporate Law, in MORITZ BÄLZ ET AL. EDS., BUSINESS LAW IN 
JAPAN – CASES AND COMMENTS (2012) 327, at 329. 
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recognize four circumstances where any issuance of shares or warrants by the target’s board 
in the event of a hostile takeover can be made for the “primary purpose” of maintaining 
control.108 Following this, the Japanese government issued a set of informal (non-binding) 
Takeover Guidelines, which provided for pre-bid takeover defences that target boards were 
allowed to establish.109 This led to several companies issuing “pre-warning rights plans” 
(PRPs) as a defensive mechanism against hostile takeovers.110 The PRPs are not akin to 
poison pills as developed in the U.S. because, among other reasons, they can be activated 
only with the approval of the shareholders.111 Defensive measures such as PRPs have also 
been litigated before the Japanese courts.112 Despite the elaborate treatment meted out by the 
Japanese courts to takeover defences, several questions remain unanswered and “the events in 
the decade following Livedoor show that Japan has defied predictions that it would become 
something akin to Delaware.”113 The lingering uncertainty in the hostile takeover regime in 
Japan could benefit incumbents and chill the market for corporate control. 
 
Similarly, Korea has developed the “proper business purpose” test to enable target boards in 
case of a hostile takeover to issue shares in a manner that overcomes the statutory pre-
emptive rights of shareholders.114 In a somewhat restrictive interpretation, the Korean 
Supreme Court found that defending against a hostile takeover would not be considered 
“proper business purpose”.115 While this might appear to go against the comparative freedom 
granted to Chinese and Japanese boards to defend themselves, managements and controlling 
shareholders of Korean companies have come up with a unique solution to extricate 
themselves from the risks of hostile takeovers; and that is through the sale of treasury shares 
to friendly parties to protect against raiders.116 Initially, the Korean courts issued contrasting 
                                                 
108  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 268. The circumstances include where the target is faced 
with a greenmail, asset stripping, and the like. 
109  Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Justice, Guidelines Regarding Takeover 
Defense for the Purposes of Protection and Enhancement of Corporate Value and Shareholders’ Common 
Interests 5-6 (May 27, 2005). See also, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese Soul? Courts, 
Corporations, and Communities—A Comment on Haley's View of Japanese Law, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV 345, 351 (2009). 
110  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 270. 
111  Id. 
112  Cases such as Nireco, Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo District Court], 1 June 2005, 1186 Hanrei 
TAIMUZU 274; Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo District Court], 9 June 2005, 1186 Hanrei TAIMUZU 265; 
Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Court], 15 June 2005, 1186 Hanrei TAIMUZU 254 (Nireco), and the 
Bulldog Sauce, Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court], 7 August 2007, 61 Minshū 2215; 1252 Hanrei TAIMUZU 
125 (Bulldog Sauce); Oda, ‘Case No. 30’, supra note 107, at 323-330, have received extensive commentary. 
Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 271-73; Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese Soul?, supra 
note 109; Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?, supra note 38, at 2178-80; Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra 
note 2, at 25-51. 
113  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 273. 
114  Korea Commercial Code, § 418. See also, Rho, supra note 10, at 300-01. 
115  Rho, supra note 10, at 300, referring to 2008Da50776, 30 January 2009 (Korea Supreme Court). 
116  Korea Commercial Code required all shares acquired by an issuer to be cancelled or disposed off 
shortly thereafter. However, by way of reforms introduced in 2011, companies are permitted to keep alive shares 
that they have acquired, so long as they do not carry voting rights during the period such shares are held by the 
company. Rho, supra note 10, at 283. Treasury shares are an elegant takeover defense mechanism as the pool of 
stock is available to management such that they can sell it to friendly holders when a takeover offer is launched, 
thereby reinstating the voting rights associated with those shares and diluting the unwelcome acquirer. See, Sang 
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rulings on the validity of treasury shares as a takeover defense. One approach found that the 
issue of treasury shares was invalid unless there was a proper business purpose,117 while the 
other broader interpretation treated treasury shares to be different from the issue of new 
shares and conferred full discretion upon the target’s board to decide when and to whom 
treasury shares may be issued (thereby deferring to the business judgment of the directors).118 
Since then, the Korean courts have begun adopting the permissive approach, which has 
become the prevalent norm.119 Although a more recent phenomenon, Korean boards are able 
to unleash their cache of treasury stock to disarm hostile acquirers.120 
 
It is clear that the development of fiduciary duties in the takeover context in all of our civil 
law Asian jurisdictions have conferred sufficient leeway to the target’s boards and controlling 
shareholders to stave off a hostile takeover. While comparisons can be made to Delaware law 
at one level, the takeover regimes in civil law Asia have proceeded on a different trajectory, 
although there is considerable diversity within each of those regimes. 
 
 3. Oversight and Monitoring by Courts 
 
Given the reliance on fiduciary duties of directors as a tool to regulate board conduct during 
hostile takeovers, it is imperative that appropriate oversight and monitoring mechanisms are 
in place to effectively implement the takeover regime. Such mechanisms could include an 
independent board, a robust court system and developed capital markets.121 Similar to 
Delaware, all our three civil law jurisdictions in Asia have place substantial reliance upon the 
courts to enforce the takeover measures.122 The similarity ends there. Unlike Delaware, which 
“has taken thirty years for [its] takeover jurisprudence to evolve to its present state”,123 the 
courts in civil law Asia do not possess the required expertise and sophistication to resolve 
disputes pertaining to complex takeover transactions. 
 
In China, neither the courts nor the administrative regulators have had the occasion to enforce 
fiduciary duties in takeover situations.124 Apart from the fact that the dearth of hostile 
                                                 
Gon Kim, South Korea: Treasury Shares as a Defence Mechanism Against Hostile Takeovers, MONDAQ (Jan. 
23, 2017), available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/53152/M+A+Private%20equity/Treasury+Shares+As+A+Defence+Mechanism+Aga
inst+Hostile+Takeovers. 
117  Rho, supra note 10, at 301-02 (referring to the Daelim case, 2005Gahap8262 (Jun. 29, 2006, Seoul 
Western District Court)). 
118  Id., at 302 (referring to the Sovereign case, 2003 Kahap4145 (Dec. 23, 2003, Seoul Central District 
Court)). 
119  Id., at 302-03. In a well-known decision involving the Samsung C&T merger case, the Seoul Higher 
Court allowed broad discretion of the board in selling treasury shares of Samsung C&T, 2015La20503 (Jul. 16, 
2015). 
120  Kim, supra note 44, at 240. 
121  Gilson, supra note 38, at 39; Kang, supra note 10, at 662. 
122  None of these legal systems place much reliance on independent directors to regulate hostile takeovers. 
For example, as to Japan, see, Gilson, supra note 38, at 41. 
123  Jacobs, supra note 100, at 350. 
124  Huang & Chen, supra note 43, at 227; CHEN, supra note 98, at 149. See also, Li, supra note 79. 
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takeovers has resulted in this situation, it has also been attributed to the lack of qualified 
judges,125 and an adequate body of precedents.126 Moreover, a culture of shareholders 
bringing private actions to enforce fiduciary duties of boards, let alone succeed in them, is 
absent in the Chinese context.127  
 
Similarly, in Japan, the task of regulating takeovers has been thrust on the court system, 
inspired largely by Delaware.128 It has been noted that “it would be a serious mistake to 
underestimate the weight of that burden”.129 Despite having created a relatively robust body 
of case law (in comparison with China and Korea), the takeover jurisprudence developed by 
the courts “leaves important questions unanswered”.130 The experience from Korea is no 
different. It does not have specialized courts to deal with complex takeover disputes, and it 
would be difficult to build up adequate expertise among the judges.131 Moreover, the practice 
of the Korean courts is to allow ample wiggle room to directors facing hostile takeovers.132 
 
Clearly, all of our civil law jurisdictions have gravitated towards Delaware by relying on its 
law and practice, whereby courts are a bulwark of takeover regulation. But, the application of 
legal principles and practice into the Asian jurisdictions has demonstrated varying results. 
China, Japan and Korea have witnessed very few cases in the takeover arena (arguably due to 
the low incidence of hostile takeovers), due to which the doctrine in the area has not been 
enriched. Moreover, courts in civil law Asia suffer from insufficient capabilities and 
resources, and they have failed to develop the requisite legal tradition and institutional 
capacity.133 Thus, in the absence of a robust court system, which is the primary driver for 
regulating target board’s conduct in case of a hostile takeover in civil law Asia, it would be 
imprudent to expect the expansion of a market for corporate control. Such a situation allows 
incumbents such as controlling shareholders and managers to entrench their positions further.  
 
 4. Effect of Transplanting Delaware Law 
 
It is clear that China, Japan and Korea have adopted the Delaware model (and, to a limited 
extent, U.K. takeover jurisprudence) in order to keep up with global standards.134 As a result, 
                                                 
125  Hui Huang, China's Takeover Law: A Comparative Analysis and Proposals For Reform, 30 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 145, 185 (2005). 
126  CHEN, supra note 98, at 138. 
127  Id., at 18. Although China has had a good number of cases brought by shareholders against directors by 
way of derivative action, and that too with a high success rate, vey few such cases have been initiated in the 
context of hostile takeovers. See Hui Huang, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings 
and Comparative Analysis, 27 BANKING AND FINANCE LAW REVIEW 619 (2012). 
128  Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese Soul?, supra note 109, at 356. 
129  Gilson, supra note 38, at 42. 
130  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 263. 
131  Choi, supra note 10, at 25. See also, Kang, supra note 10, at 624. 
132  Rho, supra note 10, at 305. 
133  See, CHEN, supra note 98, at 27 (in the context of China). 
134  Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?, supra note 38, at 2204. In the case of Japan, however, there is 
some level of disagreement as some argue that Japan has developed its own unique model that is most 
appropriate for its own circumstances. See, Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 244. 
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they have paid short shrift to home-grown mechanisms of takeover regulation.135 However, 
any convergence with the Delaware model can only be said to be formal, and it is not 
substantial or functional. The application of Delaware law is bound to be inefficient unless 
local factors, socio-economic institutions and cultural implications are accounted for.136 In 
order to enable a market for control, it is not sufficient to introduce changes in the substantive 
law.137 There is a need to build an entire ecosystem that supports legislative or regulatory 
changes so as to achieve the desired results. The somewhat inchoate transplantation of 
Delaware law into our Asian civil law jurisdictions falls substantially short of that. 
 
 5. The Role of Interest Groups 
 
In this context, it is worthwhile to consider the interplay of various interests that led to the 
hybrid situation in our civil law jurisdictions. Although the role of interest groups varies 
according to each jurisdiction, a confluence of various factors has been at play that ultimately 
resulted in a rather incumbent-friendly takeover regime. Two examples are worth discussing.  
 
First, in Japan, following the Livedoor saga,138 the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) established a Corporate Value Study Group that was the precursor to the Takeover 
Guidelines.139 The Working Group not only embraced Delaware doctrine on the ability of 
target companies to respond to hostile takeovers,140 but it also explicitly rejected the U.K.-
based board neutrality rule.141 Apart from the conceptual slant of the Working Group towards 
the Delaware approach from a substantive perspective, its findings were largely driven by the 
fact that a substantial membership of the Working Group consisted of individual trained in 
the U.S., with lesser experience of U.K. law.142 Moreover, the influence of incumbents is 
demonstrated, albeit less starkly, as one scholar notes that “importantly for METI and the 
business constituency to which it responds, Delaware takeover jurisprudence is more 
protective of management than the [U.K. Takeover] Code”.143 The domestic business 
interests have been vocal in asserting their opposition to hostile takeovers, as “Keidanren (a 
powerful Japanese business lobby) called for developing defensive measures to prevent 
“foreign predators” from taking control in Japan”. The end result is a regime that is flexible 
enough to suit the interests of various Japanese actors.144 
 
                                                 
135  Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?, supra note 38, at 2204. 
136  Id., at 251. See also, Cristina Alger, The Livedoor Looking Glass: Examining the Limits of Hostile 
Takeover Bids in Japan, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 309, 317 (2006). 
137  Id. 
138  See, text accompanying supra note 107. 
139  See, supra note 109. See also, Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?, supra note 38, at 2195-97. 
140  Joseph Lee, Critical exposition of Japanese takeover law in an international context (Working Paper, 
2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2733229. 
141  Jacobs, supra note 100, at 325. 
142  Alger, supra note 136, at 325. 
143  Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese Soul?, supra note 109, at 358. 
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The second example relates to Korea wherein corporate boards have comparatively limited 
flexibility to outmaneuver hostile acquirers. The Korean business community has lobbied 
with the government to enable companies to adopt additional takeover defenses, including the 
U.S.-style poison pills.145 However, this move did not fructify due to the concern that it may 
seek to benefit the incumbent business elites.146 Nevertheless, due to the circular and pyramid 
shareholdings as well as wide discretion granted to target boards, hostile takeovers have 
failed to gain momentum.147 In any event, as discussed earlier, the use of treasury shares has 
more recently come to occupy a prominent defensive mechanism that could arguably obviate 
the need for a poison pill.148 
 
In all, there is some evidence of local business elites within our civil law jurisdictions in Asia 
expressing their concern over the possibility of hostile takeovers. Since hostile takeovers 
could have a broader impact on the economy (e.g., through layoff of employees), particularly 
when the acquirer is a foreign entity,149 governments cannot but afford to have regard to the 
incumbents in designing the scope and content of takeover regulation.150 
 
B. Transplant of the U.K. Model into Common Law Asia 
 
Moving to our common law jurisdictions, viz., India, Hong Kong and Singapore, anecdotal 
evidence indicates that they have been subject to fewer hostile takeovers compared to our 
civil law jurisdictions. Their takeover regimes have closely followed that of the U.K. model, 
of which the board neutrality rule is the centerpiece. There is a great deal of homogeneity in 
the manner in which the three common law jurisdictions in Asia deal with hostile takeovers.  
 
Target boards in these jurisdictions are powerless in that they do not have access to a wide 
array of takeover defenses, as they must simply submit to the decisions of the shareholders, 
who possess primary decision-making powers regarding the outcome of a takeover, including 
a hostile one. Moreover, unlike our civil law jurisdictions,151 the resolution of takeover 
disputes takes place outside the court system, through the intervention of a takeover panel or 
the securities regulator. Although one might expect such a regulatory set up that immobilizes 
target boards to facilitate a market for corporate control, we are yet to witness a healthy flow 
of hostile takeovers. Among other factors, this is largely because the U.K. model, which was 
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devised in the dispersed shareholding context where takeovers are seen as a method of 
shifting control of a target from its board to the acquirer, is inapplicable to the Asian scenario 
where the role of takeover regulation is essentially to facilitate control shifts between a 
selling controlling shareholder and an acquirer.152 Such a mismatch in transplantation of rules 
from the U.K. to Asia can have unintended consequences. In developing these arguments 
further, we explore the key features of takeover regulation in India, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, examine the manner in which they are enforced and the comment on their impact 
on interest groups, primarily controlling shareholders (being business families or the state). 
 
 1. Board Neutrality Rule as the Pivot of Hostile Takeover Regulation 
 
In what amounts to a direct transplant of the mainstay of the U.K. model of regulating hostile 
takeovers, India, Hong Kong and Singapore display a steadfast adherence to the board 
neutrality rule.153 By virtue of this rule, target boards are immobilized from undertaking any 
frustrating action once a takeover offer has been made or might be imminent. They can take 
any actions such as issue new shares or convertible securities, sell or dispose of material 
assets or enter into contract otherwise than in the ordinary course of business only with the 
prior approval of the shareholders. The inability of the target managements to fend off a 
hostile acquirer without referring back to shareholders operates as a significant impediment. 
Despite the incapacity of target boards to defend themselves, why do we not witness a steady 
stream of takeovers in our common law jurisdictions? We argue this is because the board 
neutrality rule is a hollow notion in the Asian context that is misleading and steers us towards 
erroneous results. We support our argument in two ways. 
 
First, as asserted by several scholars, the board neutrality rule is merely illusory in light of the 
fact that the corporate law in our common law jurisdictions in Asia (as it is in the U.K.) 
requires shareholders to approve transactions that constitute customary takeover defences.154 
For instance, issuance of shares or convertible instruments (such as warrants) that dilute 
existing shareholders are to be authorized by a shareholder approval, although in certain cases 
general or omnibus approvals are possible.155 Similarly, the board cannot undertake a sale of 
substantial assets of the company without the prior approval of the board.156 In addition, 
listing rules of stock exchanges also impose restrictions on the ability of boards to carry out 
actions without shareholder authorization. Hence, the board neutrality rule arguably does 
                                                 
152  Varottil & Wan, supra note 34, at 25. 
153  Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) 
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Companies Act (Cap. 50), § 161 (for Singapore). 
156  Companies Act, 2013, § 180 (for India); Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622), Companies Act (Cap. 50), § 
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very little to alter the dynamics in the context of a hostile takeover, and can at best be 
described to be a policy statement of sorts. 
 
Second, and more importantly, the board neutrality rule is an empty notion in jurisdictions 
where concentrated shareholding is dominant, as is the case in Asia. The rule originated in 
the dispersed shareholding context where it makes eminent sense to withdraw the decision-
making power of the target’s board (that is effectively conflicted) in a hostile takeover and to 
hand it over to the shareholders who decide the fate of the takeover. This is due to the agency 
problems that operate between the shareholders and managers. However, when such a rule is 
juxtaposed to the Asian context, unintended results ensue given that the principal agency 
problems is one between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders.157 The 
managers do not play a significant role in the takeover context as they are essentially within 
the influence of the controlling shareholders. In such a scenario, the transfer of decision-
making powers from managers to the shareholders makes no difference as the two 
constituencies’ interests are aligned and are arguably often counter to the interests of the 
minority shareholders. Instead, the board neutrality rule has the function of further 
emboldening the controlling shareholders who are already well entrenched in the target.  
 
Hence, the board neutrality rule, which was created to serve a distinct purpose in the U.K., 
i.e. to protect shareholders from managers, has a completely different effect altogether when 
transplanted to jurisdictions in Asia where concentrated shareholding is the norm. In Asia, it 
has the unintended effect of further bolstering the position of controlling shareholders. Hence, 
the inability of managers or controlling shareholders in our common law Asian jurisdictions 
to invoke conventional takeover defenses such as poison pills and scorched earth tactics does 
not matter. 
 
 2. The Relative Non-Use of Directors’ Duties to Resolve Takeover Disputes 
 
In all of our common law jurisdictions in Asia, directors are fiduciaries and are required to 
act in the interests of the company, including in the context of takeovers. These include the 
duty of care, skill and diligence and the duty to act for proper purpose. Some of these duties 
have been developed substantially under English law, in particular the duty to act for proper 
purpose, which is usually triggered when the target undertakes actions to prefer a shareholder 
or investor in a manner that dilutes the interests of the acquirer.158 However, to our 
knowledge, there are no significant cases in India, Hong Kong or Singapore that expound on 
the scope and import of directors’ duties as a tool to resolve dispute relating to takeover 
regulation, let alone in the context of hostile situations. In our view, this is attributable to two 
factors. The first is the near absence of hostile takeovers in these jurisdictions, due to which 
the courts have not had the opportunity to clarify directors’ duties. The second is that 
takeover disputes in these jurisdictions are resolved outside the court system, a matter that we 
now turn to.  
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3. Oversight and Monitoring by Regulatory Bodies 
 
When it comes to oversight and monitoring of conduct of parties in a hostile takeover, the 
civil law and common law jurisdictions in Asia follow divergent approaches. The civil law 
jurisdictions draw their inspiration from the U.S., which focuses on litigation as a means of 
resolving takeover disputes in an ex post fashion. However, the common law jurisdictions not 
only regulate takeovers through ex ante rules, but disputes are resolved either by a takeover 
panel or by the securities regulator. In these instances, similar to the U.K., there is evidence 
of their intention to limit the involvement of the courts in resolving takeover disputes. 
 
Both Hong Kong and Singapore have established the Takeovers and Mergers Panel and the 
Securities Industry Council (SIC) respectively to make decisions regarding takeover matters. 
They follow the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers in the U.K., which has constituted the 
model for such a regulatory mechanism. The membership of these takeover panels is 
represented by a wide range of interests, including participation from the industry, investor 
community and professionals.159 The idea behind establishing such panels is to ensure speed, 
flexibility and certainty.160 Courts only have limited oversight in respect of decisions of the 
panel.161  
 
On the other hand, India has shied away from adopting a panel-like approach towards the 
enforcement of takeover regulation. Instead, it is the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI), the securities regulator, that performs the function of regulating takeovers. Even here, 
courts are generally kept outside the purview of takeover disputes.162 The resolution of 
takeover disputes outside the court system has implications in terms of political economy.163 
 
 4. The Role of Interest Groups 
 
In each of our common law jurisdictions in Asia, there is evidence that incumbents such as 
controlling shareholders have acted to preserve the status quo in terms of the design and 
implementation of the legal regime pertaining to hostile takeovers. In India, controlling 
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and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc, [1990] 1 QB 146. 
162  This is because sections §§ 15Y and 20A of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 bar 
the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain a suit or proceedings on matters in which SEBI is empowered to take 
action (e.g. securities law violations). This exclusion of civil jurisdiction has been interpreted widely with 
respect to SEBI. Kesha Appliances P Ltd v Royal Holdings Services Ltd [2006] 130 Comp. Cas. 227 (Bom). 
163  See text accompanying infra notes 174-175. 
  28 
 
shareholders in Indian companies have displayed a great deal of influence in shaping the 
takeover regulation in a manner that militate against a market for corporate control.164  
 
In the context of Singapore, one of us has argued that the adoption of the U.K.-style of 
takeover regulation is the result of interaction between the relevant interest groups, being 
significant shareholders (such as business families or the state) and the regulator.165 A clear 
episode that demonstrates this phenomenon is a consultation exercise conducted by the SIC 
wherein it sought the views of market participants on whether Singapore should adopt the 
U.S. model of takeover regulation (with discretion to directors to determine the fate of a 
takeover) or to retain the current U.K. model (where shareholder decisions are paramount).166 
The overwhelming response from market practitioners was to retain the U.K. approach with 
the board neutrality rule.167 This is perhaps attributable (at least in part) to the fact that in a 
concentrated shareholding scenario the incumbents who are the controlling shareholders are 
better off holding the decision-making power at the shareholder level where they can exercise 
significant influence, rather than to grant it to boards.168 Even if controlling shareholders do 
not have holdings that are large enough influence the directors of the target as to the fate of 
the takeover, an exercise of direct powers through shareholder decision-making could enable 
them to decide the outcome of a hostile takeover.169  
 
In Hong Kong, the influence of controlling blockholders is evidenced in other ways: in the 
manner of implementation of takeover regulation rather than its design. Given that the market 
for corporate control essentially relates to “the jockeying among blockholders for control of 
their corporate groups and the economy generally”,170 the entire slew of takeover regulation 
adopted from the U.K. is hardly used, barring certain specific provisions that relate to matters 
pertaining to controlling shareholders attempting to enhance their control over the target. 
Donald has argued that the U.K.-oriented takeover regulation has been “applied essentially as 
a ‘code of responsible corporate ownership’” and that the U.K. transplant that is focused on 
dispersed shareholding scenarios may, in the context of Hong Kong, “be a distraction from 
the main problem on which regulators should focus”.171 
 
                                                 
164  Varottil, supra note 36, at 378. For a more detailed discussion on India, see text accompanying infra 
notes 174-175. 
165  Wan, supra note 36, at 408. 
166  Securities Industry Council (SIC), Consultation Paper on Revision of the Singapore Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers 7 (1999), available at 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/publications/consultpapers/1999/Consultation%20Paper%20On%20R
evision%20of%20the%20Singapore%20Code%20on%20Take%20Overs%20and%20Mergers.pdf. The market 
practitioners consulted include investment banks and law firms. 
167  Id., at 8. 
168  But, a significant constraint with the U.K. rule is that it is costly, both in terms of time and money, to 
hold a shareholder meeting to approve the use of defences. It is likely that defences may not be applied quickly 
enough to stave off a takeover that the controlling shareholder does not accept. See Huang, supra note 125, at 
192-93. 
169  Wan, supra note 36, at 420-21. 
170  Donald, supra note 51, at 383. 
171  Id. at 403.  
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The lawmaking, oversight and monitoring process in respect of takeover regulation has an 
important role to play in the way interest groups exert their influence. As Armour, Jacobs and 
Milhaupt have noted that, unlike the judiciary, regulators and market actors tend to come 
under the focus of interest groups while introducing new rules.172 Regulators appear to be 
somewhat responsive to such interest groups, and quite often the effort to preempt a 
legislative outcome ends up conforming to the preferences of the dominant interest groups.173 
For example, in India, SEBI usually devises takeover regulation by appointing a committee 
of experts to examine the issues and make recommendations.174 Such committees tends to 
have a strong representation from domestic Indian business interests and also leading 
corporate lawyers.175 Through this, the Indian industry has maintained a strong voice in the 
shaping of takeover regulation, which explains the nature of regulation that emboldens 
controlling shareholders and impedes a free market for corporate control. Similar public 
consultation exercises tend to provide avenues for dominant market participants to forcefully 
put forward their positions, as we have seen in the case of Singapore.176 Moreover, the 
market-facing membership of the takeover panels in both Singapore and Hong Kong will 
likely attract local business elites such as controlling shareholders to assuage their concerns 
that would make the design and implementation of takeover regulation in these jurisdictions 
vastly different from the origin country of the U.K. 
 
 
V. IMPLICATIONS FROM THE STUDY OF TAKEOVER REGULATION IN ASIA 
 
Our analysis of the six Asian jurisdictions indicates that they adopt a dichotomous approach 
towards takeover regulation. While the civil law jurisdictions of China, Japan and Korea 
cross-refer more closely to the U.S. (Delaware) position that confers significant freedom to 
target boards, the common law jurisdictions of India, Hong Kong and Singapore cling to the 
U.K.-based board neutrality approach that passes on decision-making powers to the 
shareholders. Despite the different approaches adopted by these countries, there is one 
important commonality. No matter how the takeover regulation is designed or implemented, 
the interest group that has been the focus of the rulemaking process is the controlling or other 
dominant shareholders. This is not at all surprising given that all of these jurisdictions witness 
concentrated (or, in the case of Japan, stable) shareholding. But, as we have seen, the 
controlling shareholders have not simply rested in the comfort of their shareholding power, 
but instead have sought to bolster their position in the company. Here we consider some of 
the key lessons and implications that emerge from the study, and close with some normative 
observations regarding the possible direction that takeover regulation in Asia might take. 
 
A. (In)consistency with the Theoretical Framework 
 
                                                 
172  Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2, at 230. 
173  Id., at 232. 
174  Varottil, supra note 36, at 378. 
175  Id. 
176  See, supra notes 165 to 169, and accompanying text. 
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Juxtaposing our findings with the theoretical framework set out by Armour and Skeel, it is 
clear that the Asian scenario relating to takeover regulation supports their theory in that the 
process of evolution of the takeover regime is important in understanding the substantive 
nature of the rules, and that interest groups tend to exert significant influence in the process 
and therefore regulatory outcomes as well. However, delving one level deeper, divergences 
with Armour and Skeel emerge. Their analysis of origin country rules demonstrates 
differences in hostile takeover regimes (i.e., manager-oriented in the U.S. and shareholder-
oriented in the U.K.) and the interest groups that were influential in the process (i.e., 
managers in the U.S. and institutional investors in the U.K.). When this framework is applied 
to the recipient countries in Asia, a different position ensues. Even though there is a similar 
bifurcation between the U.S. and the U.K. as in Armour and Skeel, wherein the civil law 
jurisdictions in Asia have drawn their inspiration from the U.S., while the common law 
jurisdictions from the U.K., ultimately the interest group that has been dominant in the 
process is the controlling shareholders, who are the business elite in these jurisdictions 
comprising either business families or the state. Armour and Skeel’s account understandably 
does not account for controlling shareholders. While Armour and Skeel note that differences 
in the evolution of takeover regulation could result in different outcomes as regards dominant 
interest groups (e.g., managers versus shareholders), our analysis demonstrates that radically 
different regimes in hostile takeover regulation could nevertheless inure to the benefit of a 
single constituency, namely controlling shareholders.  
 
For the aforesaid reasons, we argue that it would be unwise to draw inferences from theories 
based on takeover regulation emanating from the U.S. and the U.K. A direct application of 
these theories to our Asian jurisdictions is bound to result in incongruences due to the 
prevalence of local factors.177 Such factors are likely to be idiosyncratic not just in relation to 
the U.S. and the U.K., but even relative to other Asian jurisdictions. Unless these factors are 
duly accounted for, “the same takeover rules might have different or even opposite effects in 
different markets”.178 
 
B. Pro-Incumbency: A Controlling Shareholder-Centric Approach 
 
As we have seen, takeover regulation in our Asian jurisdictions has adopted an incumbent-
friendly approach, regardless of the specific model in play. Controlling shareholders tend to 
play a central role in entrenching themselves further in the companies they already control.179 
The rulemaking process cannot afford to ignore their interests and concerns. Here, our civil 
law jurisdictions in Asia follow a predictable pattern that is consistent with the interest group 
analysis of takeover regulation in that the focus of the law and its implementation is on 
providing greater power to the incumbents to protect themselves against hostile takeovers, 
                                                 
177  See, Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 244. 
178  Ventoruzzo, supra note 3, at 141 (noting a similar result in the context of takeover regulation in 
continental Europe). 
179  Even though controlling shareholders may not fear an imminent battle for control over their company 
due comfort of their significant shareholding, they nevertheless have an interest in ensuring the protection of 
their position in the future where their holdings might be diluted due to additional capital raising efforts. 
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including by erecting defenses. In these jurisdictions, while the board has been conferred 
these powers, the scenario is very different from the Anglo-American approach where there is 
a difference between ownership and management control. In Asia, given the concentrated 
shareholder structures, boards operate under the shadow of the controlling shareholders’ 
influence, as the directors owe their election and continuation in office to the wishes of the 
shareholders (where the controllers have a major say). Hence, we argue that any benefits 
conferred upon the board in the Asian context have to be viewed differently from the Anglo-
American approach. In Asia, conferring freedom to the boards to resist hostile takeover not 
only protects incumbent management, but also helps bolster the controlling shareholders’ 
position in the company.  
 
Moving on to our common law jurisdictions in Asia, the position is even more complex. We 
come back to a question we have raised before:180 why have the incumbents rested easy with 
the board neutrality rule that takes away the powers of the board to defend against hostile 
takeovers? Why have they not protested against the limitations on corporate boards in 
common law Asia to establish takeover defenses such as poison pills and scorched earth 
tactics? We proffer some explanation in seeking to respond to these questions.   
 
At the outset, if we were to apply the Armour and Skeel analysis, the board neutrality rule in 
common law Asia ought to have found its place due to the influence of institutional investors, 
as it did in the U.K. But, institutional investors do not appear to have played much of a role in 
the rulemaking process in common law Asia, due to which the Armour and Skeel analysis 
fails to shed light on this conundrum.  
 
On the other hand, we argue that the adoption and continuation of the board neutrality rule 
may signify a level of inertia on the part of the regulators and the market participants. We 
offer several reasons. First, takeovers are yet to capture sufficient attention in common law 
Asia to warrant a paradigm shift in their regulation. Due to the high concentration of 
shareholdings, the threat perception from hostile takeovers is not yet material. Second, the 
board neutrality rule results in opposite and unintended consequences in common law Asia 
when compared with the U.K. model. The rule shifts power over the outcome of a hostile 
takeover from the board to the shareholders. Instead of disarming the power of the 
incumbents (e.g. managers in the U.K.), it has the effect emboldening them (e.g. controlling 
shareholders in common law Asia). It is little wonder that the business elites in the Asian 
jurisdictions see no reason disturb the status quo. Third, a mere change to the board neutrality 
rule that is situated within takeover regulation is insufficient to strengthen the controlling 
shareholders’ position. Given the illusory nature of the rule,181 there is a need to introduce 
reforms to company law to enable the use of takeover defenses such as poison pills. Applying 
interest group theory,182 we find that legislature is usually less responsive to interest group 
influences in the takeover arena in the absence of a scandal. In that sense, addressing the 
                                                 
180  See, supra Part I. 
181  See, supra notes 154 to 156, and accompanying text. 
182  See, Armour, Jacobs & Milhaupt, supra note 2, at 229-32. 
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board neutrality rule or bringing about other changes to the takeover codes in common law 
Asia must be accompanied by reforms to corporate law, which might be harder to come by.  
 
This leads us to some key questions. Given the peculiar nature of application of the Anglo-
American rules to the Asian context, why have our Asian jurisdictions chosen to transplant 
them? What factors have motivated them to exercise that choice? We now turn to address 
these. 
 
C. Role of the State in Influencing the Outcome of Transplantation 
 
Our analysis of the individual jurisdictions in Asia183 indicates various reasons why they 
decided to borrow extensively from the Anglo-American approaches. Asian jurisdictions find 
it attractive to adopt “global standards”, which are easy to justify, especially when reforms 
need to be introduced in a time-bound manner.184 Moreover, the state has reasons to prefer 
well-tested approaches to takeover regulation, especially from developed economies, as they 
carry a signaling effect. For instance, imposing a board neutrality rule might be a sign that the 
economy is open to acquisitions and foreign investment, as a means towards economic 
growth. Due to these reasons, all of our jurisdictions have shunned a purely homegrown 
approach towards takeover regulation. This is partly attributable to the fact that takeovers, in 
particular the hostile variety, is a relatively novel phenomenon in Asia compared to the West. 
 
Since the state places importance on ensuring minority investor protection in order to 
promote deep and liquid capital markets, our Asian jurisdictions have sought to create a 
balance between protecting shareholder interests, for instance by the outright prohibition on 
certain defensive measures), and the promotion of corporate objectives and local business 
interests. This can be a difficult task due to the operation of several local factors, which 
explains why several our jurisdictions that follow similar approaches towards takeover 
regulation demonstrate differing outcomes. As we have seen,185 such a move triggered by 
globalization without accounting for local peculiarities would at most result in formal 
convergence. 
 
D. Broader Implications of the Findings 
 
As is evident, it is myopic to view takeover regulation in Asia merely through the lens of the 
Anglo-American approach.186 Due regard must be had to the local factors and idiosyncrasies 
that map the Asian corporate landscape. Even the theoretical literature on takeover regulation 
has been steeped in the Anglo-American context, and has only recently begun to gain ground 
                                                 
183  See, supra Part IV. 
184  Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?, supra note 38, at 2204; Alger, supra note 136, at 325; Bliss 
Burdett Pak, National Markets and New Defenses: The Case for an East Asian Opt-In Takeover Law, 20 
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185  See, supra Part IVA4 (in the context of our civil law Asian jurisdictions, particularly Japan). 
186  See, Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 37, at 258 (in the context of Japan). 
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in other regions such as Asia. In the end, the specific circumstances and factors present in 
each individual jurisdiction may explain the regulatory choice it makes as regards takeovers. 
 
Broadening the discussion to the sphere of corporate governance, it would be imprudent for 
Asian jurisdictions to consider the market for corporate control as a governance-enhancing 
mechanism. Policy-makers and scholars may very well divert their attention to other 
mechanisms that are appropriate in the Asian context. The focus of takeover regulation in 
Asia is hence narrowed to facilitating organized changes of control between parties in a 
manner that does not undermine the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Lastly, our research also reveals some lessons relating to the operation of legal systems. The 
‘legal origins’ strain of literature posits that, in common law countries, the judiciary plays an 
important role in defining and enforcing investor rights.187 Hence, minority investor 
protection is an important tool for the development of deep capital markets. On the other 
hand, civil law countries tend to rely heavily on governmental intervention in protecting 
minority shareholder interests. The legal origins analysis gives rise to curious outcomes in 
takeover regulation pertaining to our Asian jurisdictions. First, the originating countries for 
the diffusion of takeover regulation (i.e., the U.K. and the U.S.) are both common law 
jurisdictions. However, their regulations have been transplanted to Asian jurisdictions that 
follow common law as well as civil law. In other words, our Asian civil law jurisdictions 
have found it appropriate to look to the U.K. and the U.S. (as leading takeover markets) 
rather than to other civil law jurisdictions. Second, and more intriguingly, the diffusion of 
legal norms has occurred in rather counterintuitive ways. All our common law jurisdictions 
have preferred not to use the court system to resolve takeover disputes.188 While the use of a 
takeover panel-like arrangement by Hong Kong and Singapore is understandable, given the 
preference displayed by the UK, the exclusion of courts from takeover regulation in India is 
less clear. Our Asian jurisdictions following civil law have, instead, embraced the use of ex 
post determination through courts as a means of regulating takeovers, especially through 
fiduciary duties of the target’s board. This phenomenon undermines the applicability of the 
‘legal origins’ thesis, as it receives no support in takeover regulation. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Takeover regulation plays an essential role in the market for corporate control, which is an 
important mechanism of corporate governance. The origin of regulatory mechanisms as well 
as substantial literature in the field have hitherto taken on a strong Anglo-American flavor. In 
this article, we undertake a broader comparative approach by which we study the importation 
into Asia from the U.S. and the U.K. of the modes of regulating hostile takeovers. Our 
comparison extends in two ways: one, to compare the U.S. and the U.K. on the one hand, and 
                                                 
187  See, supra note 48. 
188  Similar findings regarding the use of courts can be found in the context of shareholder derivative 
actions. See, Puchniak, supra note 90, at 10-11, 14. 
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six Asian jurisdictions with high incidence of takeover activity, and the second to compare 
among these Asian jurisdictions themselves. 
 
As we seek to demonstrate, the transplant of the U.S. and the U.K. takeover regulation to the 
Asian jurisdictions results in unintended consequences, attributable largely to differences in 
local factors, including shareholder pattern, capacity and sophistication of the regulators and 
courts, as well as cultural traits. The evolution, design and enforcement of takeover regulation 
has tended to benefit the incumbents, being controlling shareholders such as business families 
and the state that are ubiquitous in the Asian corporate sphere. Ultimately, it is our case that 
Asian takeover regulation (and that of each individual jurisdiction) must viewed on its own 
terms rather than through an Anglo-American perspective. 
 
***** 
